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The well-publicized Christie-Schultz collusion hypothesis provides an experiment for studying the
determinants of market structure in Nasdaq markets. Some markets experienced substantial com-
pression in the pro￿t margins for market makers due to the change of quoting convention from
odd-eighth avoidance to the use of the full spectrum of eighths. Contrary to what competitive
theory predicts, the empirical results suggest that this change led to net entry of market makers,
after controlling for a time ￿xed e⁄ect, trading activity, information aspects of trading, market
size, volatility, and unobserved individual market e⁄ects. Moreover, the robustness and signi￿-
cance of this ￿nding do not change as di⁄erent estimation methods are employed to correct for
possible self-selection bias of the estimated average treatment e⁄ect. Surprisingly, dealer ￿rms
entered these markets despite the compression of pro￿t margins. An explanation is provided
based on collusion and investment in entry deterrence related to the practice of ￿preferencing￿ .
(JEL L11 G20 C33)1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How do entry and exit decisions respond to proﬁt margins? How sensitive is market structure to
change?1 To what extent is there hysteresis in the number of ﬁrms? This study intends to shed
light on these questions. Speciﬁcally, I study the impact on the number of ﬁrms (market makers) in
Nasdaq markets in response to an unpredicted exogenous compression of proﬁt margins.
One main diﬃculty in studying the relationship between the number of ﬁrms in the market and
proﬁt margins is the simultaneity problem. Typically, it is hard to distinguish causality. Moreover,
most exogenous changes in the market environment are predetermined policy changes that are
foreseen by ﬁrms (both incumbents and potential entrants). Since rational ﬁrms adjust their behavior
beforehand, the study of such changes can be diﬃcult (anticipation eﬀect). The attractiveness of
exploring Nasdaq markets is that they experienced an exogenous and unpredicted decline in proﬁt
margins.
On May 27, 1994, due to extensive media coverage of an allegation of collusion (the Christie-
Schultz collusion hypothesis), the spreads of some of the most important issues in the Nasdaq
market dropped by almost 50%. Since the spread represents the proﬁt margin of market making,
this unpredicted exogenous drop in the spread creates an excellent opportunity to examine the
sensitivity of entry and exit in Nasdaq market makers. It is important to emphasize that the
media blitz associated with the collusion story, and the ensuing drop in spreads, was exogenous and
unpredicted by market makers in Nasdaq.
To be speciﬁc, I am interested in changes to the numbers of ﬁrms in markets where market
makers practiced odd-eighth avoidance (the absence of quote prices ended with 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, and
7/8) before the media blitz, and switched to the use of the full spectrum of eighths afterwards.2’3
1There are many diﬀerent aspects for the term “market structure”. In this study, it refers to the number of market
makers. I use these two terms interchangeably.
2The origin of trading stocks in (integer) multiples of eighths, the tick size rule, is unclear. Angel (1997) points out
the lack of evidence for the Wall Street lore which claims the one-eighth tick size is an anachronism traceable to the
colony-use of the Spanish “pieces of eight” coins (so-called because they were equal to eight silver reals). Dyl, Witte,
and Gorman (2002) believe it originates from the pre-decimal British currency “half-crown”, which equals one-eighth
of a pound. In an introductory book of stock markets, Dalton (1988) believes it originates from cutting bars of silver
into pieces of eight to purchase shares in the cargo (bills of lading, a primitive form of securities).
3For the time period that I am interested, the tick size is one-eighth of a dollar, $1/8, for issues with bid prices
1Note that when ﬁrms use only even-eighth quotes, the resulting minimum spread is at least $1/4.
As they switch to the full spectrum of eighths, the resulting minimum spread becomes $1/8. This
is, potentially, a 50% drop in the proﬁt margin for these markets. It is this impact on the market
structure that I am interested in. In the following I refer to the markets that switched their quoting
convention as the “treatment group”. The “treatment” here is the compression of proﬁt margins
caused by the change in the quoting convention associated with the media blitz.
To evaluate this impact to the market structure, I need a comparison group that did not experi-
ence a change in the quoting convention, but otherwise experienced the same changes in other aspects
of the environment. There are two candidate groups of markets for this purpose. One comprises
markets where ﬁrms price issues in the full spectrum of eighths consistently, and the other comprises
markets where ﬁrms practice odd-eighth avoidance consistently. Both groups do not experience the
drop in proﬁt margins caused by the media blitz of the collusion story; and hence, can be used as
the comparison group.
As in other natural experiment studies, the potential selection bias is always a concern. Some
markets switched their quoting convention from odd-eighth avoidance to full spectrum, while others
remained odd-eighth avoidance. Although I assume the switch of quoting convention to be exoge-
nous, diﬀerent empirical strategies — control functions, instrumental variable estimations, propensity
score matching estimation, and other methods based on estimated propensity scores — are used in
the estimation to address the selection problem.
The main ﬁnding of the study is surprising. Controlling for diﬀerent market characteristics (time
ﬁxed eﬀect, trading activity, information aspects of trading, market size, volatility, and unobserved
individual market eﬀects), I do indeed ﬁnd that there is a statistically signiﬁcant change in numbers
of ﬁrms for markets that went from largely quoting even-eighths to quoting the full spectrum.
Moreover, this result is robust to various estimation methods. However, the eﬀect of the change
in the quoting convention (and thus the compression of proﬁt margins) was to induce net entry;
resulting in about one to two more market makers. This is completely at odds to the prediction
based on a competitive market framework with free entry and exit (see Section 3).
One possible explanation is as follows. Suppose there exists some market practice in Nasdaq
larger than $10. Eﬀective June 2, 1997, market makers with bid prices exceeding $10 are free to post quotes in
increments of $1/16. As to issues with bid prices less than $10, quotes continue to be posted in increments of $1/32.
The Nasdaq stock market decimalized in April, 2001.
2markets, unobserved by econometricians, that can be used as a device for entry deterrence. To what
extent the incumbent ﬁr m sc h o o s et od e t e re n t r yd e p e n d so nt h es i z eo fp r o ﬁts to be protected.
In those high proﬁt margin markets (such as the odd-eighth avoidance ones), entry is successfully
“blockaded” to preserve high proﬁt margins. The resulting drop in the proﬁt margin due to the
switch to quoting all-eighths reduces (or eliminates) incumbent market makers’ incentive to invest
in entry deterrence and thereby invites entry.
This scenario seems to be consistent with the collusion story. Firms in the odd-eighth avoidance
markets (tacitly or explicitly) collude to use only even eighth quotes and artiﬁcially maintain high
spreads that would otherwise not be achievable. Furthermore, investment in entry barriers preserves
cartel rents in these markets. Once the media exposes the collusive scheme and causes a shift in the
quoting convention, entry occurs. I will later argue that the practice of “preferencing” may be that
entry barrier.
The next section provides more background information related to the Christie-Schultz hypoth-
esis. It also reviews some empirical studies related to the Nasdaq market structure. Section 3
provides a simple theoretical structure to organize our thoughts on what to expect in a competitive
framework with free entry and exit. Section 4 explains the construction of the data set and provides
some summary statistics. Section 5 describes the empirical approach, presents the ﬁndings, and
proposes the conjectured explanation. The ﬁnal section concludes the study.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 The Christie-Schultz Collusion Hypothesis
The collusion debate started when several national newspapers published stories on the research
ﬁnding of Christie and Schultz (1994) on May 26 and May 27, 1994. After examining the 1991 quote
data of the top 100 actively traded Nasdaq securities, Christie and Schultz (1994) ﬁnd that odd-
eighth quotes are virtually nonexistent for 70 of these issues. Furthermore, the absence of odd-eighth
quotes cannot be explained by the negotiation hypothesis of Harris (1991), trading activity, or other
variables thought to inﬂuence spreads. The failure to justify the practice of odd-eighth avoidance by
economic factors raised the question of whether Nasdaq market makers implicitly collude to maintain
artiﬁcially high spreads.
What makes things even more interesting is that some market makers in those odd-eighth avoid-
3ance issues adopted odd-eighth quotes immediately after the media coverage. As pointed out in
Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994), on May 27, dealers in Amgen, Cisco Systems, and Microsoft
sharply increased their use of odd-eighth quotes, and as a result spreads fell by nearly 50%. This
pattern is repeated for Apple Computer the following trading day. They also note that virtually all
dealers for these issues moved in unison in adopting odd-eighth quotes.
Dutta and Madhavan (1997) provide a game-theoretic framework of dynamic dealer pricing, and
characterize the possibility of tacit collusion in a dealer market. They demonstrate the ability for
dealer ﬁrms to earn above normal proﬁts in the absence of price discreteness or asymmetric infor-
mation, and show that the ability to collude depends on factors that restrict access to order ﬂows.4
Christie and Schultz (1999) provide empirical evidence on market makers’ ability to coordinate on
initiating and withdrawal of odd-eighth quotes within the span of one trading day. There are also
studies that provide additional evidence supporting the collusion hypothesis. Examining spread data
on issues that change listings (from Nasdaq to NYSE or AMEX, or the other way around), Bar-
clay (1997) and Barclay, Kandel, and Marx (1998) ﬁnd that there is a decrease in the spread when
an issue moves from Nasdaq to NYSE or AMEX, and the decrease is largest when market makers
practice odd-eighth avoidance. Furthermore, there is an increase in the spread when an issue moves
from AMEX to Nasdaq, and the increase is largest when Nasdaq market makers practice odd-eighth
avoidance. As in Christie and Schultz (1994), they cannot identify security-speciﬁc characteristics
that contribute to the large spreads observed when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes.
There are other studies that provide alternative explanations to the wide spreads in Nasdaq.5
Kandel and Marx (1999, 1997) argue the wide spreads in Nasdaq odd-eighth avoidance markets can
be justiﬁed in a competitive framework where ﬁrms compete in discrete prices. The discreteness of
the quote prices (due to the tick size rule) results in multiple equilibria, and the practice of odd-eighth
avoidance is used as a coordination device to “select” the equilibrium with a higher spread. Grossman
et al. (1997) argue the absence of odd-eighth quotes in some Nasdaq markets is no diﬀerent from
4Following this direction, Parlour and Rajan (2003) explicitly model the eﬀect of one of these factors — preferencing
— on competition in the retail brokers and marker makers. They show that, with preferencing, there is no equilibrium
in which market makers earn zero proﬁts. Spreads widen to more than the decrease in the intermediation fee. This
provides a game-theoretical justiﬁcation to the experimental results in Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1998) where they ﬁnd
preferencing may signiﬁcantly degrade market performance in laboratory ﬁnancial markets (e.g., wider spreads).
5As a result of the practice of odd-eighth avoidance, the minimum spread is higher than it would otherwise be.
However, the spread can be artiﬁcially high due to other reasons. To the extent that these studies oﬀer alternative
explanations to the high spreads in Nasdaq markets, they do not explain why market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes.
4that of price clustering in other ﬁnancial markets (ﬁrst documented in Harris (1991)), and provide
a competitive theory of price clustering. Demsetz (1997) attributes the relatively high spreads in
Nasdaq markets to the way that market makers accommodate limit orders. Huang and Stoll (1996)
emphasize the importance of other market aspects (e.g., internationalization, preferencing of order
ﬂows, and alternative interdealer trading systems) in explaining the relatively high spreads found
in Nasdaq markets. Finally, Godek (1996) characterizes the absence of odd-eighth quotes in a
competitive equilibrium with preferenced orders.
The bottom line is: to what extent the ﬁndings in Christie and Schultz (1994), Christie, Harris,
and Schultz (1994), and other studies actually reﬂect collusive behavior among Nasdaq market
makers remains highly controversial. As Woodward (1996, p.33) puts it: “... not just a casual
observation of clustered prices or other arcana, should persuade us that the industry is anything
other than competitive.”
2.2 Market Structure and Entry and Exit in Nasdaq Markets
In a review article one year later, Christie and Schultz (1995) make a reference to the non-responsiveness
of entry and exit in those markets that are studied in Christie and Schultz (1994). They note that
the signiﬁcant reduction in market maker revenues subsequent to May 27, 1997, does not appear
to have dissuaded dealers from making markets in any of these stocks. The same market makers
that ﬁnd it proﬁtable to trade these issues with a minimum spread of $1/4 are still making markets
despite a decline in the minimum spread to $1/8. Given the apparent ease of entry and exit in
Nasdaq market making, this contradicts what conventional wisdom would suggest in a competitive
environment.
Nevertheless, several empirical studies on the relationship between spreads and entry and exit
decisions provide a diﬀerent picture. Wahal (1997) documents the pervasiveness of entry and exit
in Nasdaq markets. Entry and exit (both the number of market makers and the probability of entry
and exit) are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by trading intensity, volatility, and the quoted bid-ask spread.
Controlling for the eﬀects of changes in volume and volatility, more entry (exit) is associated with a
decrease (increase) in the spread. Goldstein and Nelling (1999) and Klock and McCormick (1999)
also ﬁnd a negative relationship between spreads and the number of market makers. Weston (2000)
examines a reform that results in signiﬁcant declines in market making rents, and concludes it
induces exit, and markets are less concentrated.
5These observations are consistent with a typical competitive environment of dealer pricing: as
there are more market makers in the market, the intensiﬁed price competition reduces the spread,
and market makers exit markets when there is an exogenous compression of the proﬁt margin. Based
on these results, one expects to see decreases in the number of market makers in those markets where
ﬁrms moved away from odd-eighth avoidance practice due to the compression of proﬁt margins.
Nevertheless, none of the studies in the current literature takes advantage of the unpredicted
exogenous change in spreads caused by the media blitz associated with the Christie-Schultz collusion
hypothesis. Due to the simultaneity problem and the anticipation eﬀect involved in the determination
of the relationship between market structure and proﬁt margins, one needs to be careful in choosing
the econometric methods and in interpreting the results.6
3 A Simple Model
In this section I use a simple two-stage game to provide a theoretical construct for the relationship
between the proﬁt margin and the equilibrium number of market makers in a competitive environ-
ment with free entry and exit. At the ﬁrst stage, potential ﬁrms decide whether or not to enter
where entry requires a (sunk) ﬁxed cost K>0. At the second stage, ﬁrms compete in bid and ask
prices.7 The ﬁrm with the highest bid price gets all the sell orders, and the ﬁrm with the lowest
ask price gets all the buy orders. When two or more ﬁrms have the highest bid or lowest ask, they
share the orders. At the end of the game, market makers “go home ﬂat” (unwind longs and cover
up shorts) at the market clearing prices.
The main result is that the discreteness of price and the go-home-ﬂat assumption result in
multiple equilibria where ﬁrms earn normal proﬁts. The equilibrium spread is determined by the
marginal cost of trading and the tick size. There are at least two equilibrium spreads, one higher
than the other. For the one with a higher spread, there will be more ﬁrms than that of the one with
al o w e rs p r e a d .
6To address the simultaneity (endogeneity) problem involved in the determination of the relationship between
market structure and proﬁt margins, Goldstein and Nelling (1999) use a simultaneous equations framework, while
Klock and McCormick (1999) adopt an instrument for the number of market makers variable.
7At the second stage, the game is essentially the same as the discrete price game introduced by Kandel and Marx
(1997, 1999) though with a few diﬀerences. First, I explicitly model the demand and supply for liquidity. Second,
the market clears at the bid and ask prices such that the expected supply of liquidity equals the expected demand.
Third, market makers are assumed to unwind longs and cover up shorts at the market clearing prices.
6As in other two-stage settings, I solve the game through backward induction. Let there be n ≥ 2
market makers in the market. Denoting the tick size as ∇, market makers are only allowed to compete
in (bid, ask)≡ (Bi,A i),w h e r eBi and Ai are both integer multiples of the tick size ∇. Assume the
marginal cost of trading one share of the issue is constant and equal to C ≡ c∇, c ≥ 0.T h e r e
is no other cost of trading. For bids (B1,B2,...,Bn) ≡ (b1,b 2,...,bn)∇ and asks (A1,A2,...,An) ≡
(a1,a 2,...,an)∇, market makers expect there to be: D(a) ≡ E[ e D(min{a1,a 2,...,a n})] ≥ 0 buy
orders, and S(b) ≡ E[e S(max{b1,b 2,...,bn})] ≥ 0 sell orders.8 Ap a i ro fp r i c e s(b,a) clears the market
if and only if: S(b)=D(a). Denote the market clearing quantity as Q(b,a). Finally, I assume D(·)
and S(·) to be monotonic and symmetric as in Dutta and Madhavan (1997).
To look for a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium that clears the market, consider n−1 market
makers quoting the price pair ( b B, b A) ≡ (b b,b a)∇, such that D(b a)=S(b b).F o rt h enth market maker,
there are eight pure strategies to consider:
{b∇,(b − 1)∇,(b +1 ) ∇}×{ a∇,(a − 1)∇,(a +1 ) ∇}\{((b − 1)∇,(a +1 ) ∇))}.
These strategies and the associated expected proﬁts are listed below:
Stg. (Bid , Ask) Expected Proﬁts
A (b b,b a)∇ (b a − c)∇D(b a)/n − (b b + c)∇S(b b)/n
B (b b +1 ,b a − 1)∇ (b a − 1 − c)∇D(b a − 1) − (b b +1+c)∇S(b b +1 )
C (b b,b a − 1)∇ (b a − 1 − c)∇D(b a − 1) − (b b + c)∇S(b b)/n
−[D(b a − 1) − S(b b)/n)][p(b b,b a − 1) + C]
D (b b +1 ,b a)∇ (b a − c)∇D(b a)/n − (b b +1+c)∇S(b b +1 )
+[S(b b +1 )− D(b a)/n)][p(b b +1 ,b a) − C]
E (b b,b a +1 ) ∇ −(b b + c)∇S(b b)/n + S(b b)[p(b b,b a +1 )− C]/n
F (b b − 1,b a)∇ (b a − c)∇D(b a)/n − D(b a)[p(b b − 1,b a)+C]/n
G (b b +1 ,b a +1 ) ∇ −(b b +1+c)∇S(b b +1 )+S(b b +1 ) [ p(b b +1 ,b a +1 )− C]
H (b b − 1,b a − 1)∇ (b a − 1 − c)∇D(b a − 1) − D(b a − 1)[p(b b − 1,b a − 1) + C]
where p(·,·) is the price that market maker n disposes longs and covers up shorts. The remaining
work is to ﬁgure out the values for p(·,·) and derive conditions under which market maker n would
not deviate from strategy A.
8Note that since Bi and Ai are integer multiples of the tick size, ai and bi are both integers for all i =1 ,2,...,n.
7Note that, strategy B reduces the spread to (b ρ−2)∇ and increases the liquidity demand (supply)
to D(b a − 1) (S(b b +1 ) ). By symmetry, D(b a − 1) = S(b b +1 ) , and the market clears. For strategies
Ca n dH ,t h e r ei se x c e s sd e m a n do fD(b a − 1) − S(b b) for liquidity in the market; therefore, for the
market to clear, symmetry requires p(b b,b a − 1) = p(b b − 1,b a − 1) = (b b +1 ) ∇. For strategies D and
G, there is excess supply of S(b b +1 )− D(b a) for liquidity in the market; therefore, for the market
to clear, symmetry requires p(b b +1 ,b a)=p(b b +1 ,b a +1 )=( b a − 1)∇. Finally, strategies E and F
both result in the same spread as strategy A, b ρ∇. Since they change neither demand nor supply,
p(b b,b a +1 )=b b∇ and p(b b − 1,b a)=b a∇.
Substitute p(·,·) into the proﬁt expressions, one can derive the following suﬃcient condition
for ( b B, b A) to be a (pure strategy) symmetric equilibrium:
2c ≤ b ρ ≤ 2c +2 .
Hence, at the second stage of the game, there are at least two equilibrium spreads: one with the
marginal trading cost plus one tick size (2C +∇) and the other with the marginal trading cost plus
two ticks (2C +2 ∇).9 Both equilibria result in proﬁts above the marginal cost of trading.10
Given free entry at the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms join the market until above normal proﬁts are competed
away. Thus, the equilibrium number of market makers, n∗, is determined by the zero proﬁt condition:
n∗ =( b ρ − 2c)∇Q(b b,b a)/K.
It is clear from this expression that an exogenous compression of the spread b ρ should reduce the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms n∗ as long as it does not increase the equilibrium quantity Q(b b,b a) by a
“large” amount.11
The basis for the ensuing empirical analysis is that the media blitz was a focal event causing
the equilibrium to shift to one with a smaller spread. By the theory in this section, those markets
experiencing such a shift should be expected to experience net exit.
9Unless c is an integer, it is unlikely to have a equilibrium where the spread equals marginal cost: e ρ∇ =2 C.I ti s
possible to have more than two equilibria depending on n, D(·),a n dS(·). However, for “large” n0s and quantities, it
is most likely there are only these two equilibria.
10As far as the theory is concerned, the equilibrium spread is decided by the tick size ∇ as well as the marginal
trading cost 2C. It is silent as to which equilibrium, 2C + ∇ or 2C +2 ∇, that the market eventually resolves.
11For example, an exogenous shift in the equilibrium so that the spread goes from 2C +2 ∇ to 2C + ∇ causes the
number of market makers to change from 2∇Q(e b,e a)/K to either ∇Q(e b +1 ,e a)/K or ∇Q(e b,e a − 1)/K.A s l o n g a s
max{Q(e b +1 ,e a),Q(e b,e a − 1)} < 2Q(e b,e a), the shift reduces the equilibrium number of market makers.
84 Data and Empirical Methods
4.1 Data Sources
Iu s et w od i ﬀerent data sources for this study: the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote
Database (NYSE TAQ), and the Center for Research in Security Prices US Stock Database (CRSP).
The TAQ database provides intraday quotes for all securities listed on the Nasdaq National Market
(NNM) and the Nasdaq SmallCap. These intraday quote data can be used to identify markets
where ﬁrms practice odd-eighth avoidance. The CRSP database provides time series data on the
number of market makers, trading activity, volatility, capitalization, shares outstanding, and other
information.
The complete sample period starts from the ﬁrst trading day in 1993 to the last trading day
in 1995 for a three-year span. I divide it into two separate periods, the pre-impact period: from
January 1, 1993 to May 26, 1994, and the post-impact period: from June 3, 1994, to December 31,
1995.
4.2 Identifying Odd-eighth Avoidance Issues
The ﬁrst step in organizing the data is to identify odd-eighth avoidance issues. Given the two quoting
conventions in Nasdaq markets (odd-eight avoidance or full spectrum) and the two segments (before
and after the impact), a tick size one-eighth issue belongs to one of the following four possible groups:
Quoting Conventions
Before the Impact: After the Impact:
Jan.1, ’93 — May 26, ’94 June 3, ’94 — Dec. 31, ’95
Case OO: odd-eighth avoidance odd-eighth avoidance
Case OA: odd-eighth avoidance all-eighth
Case AA: all-eighth all-eighth
Case AO: all-eighth odd-eighth avoidance
Following Christie and Schultz (1994), I designate an issue as an odd-eighth avoidance one when
fewer than 25% of the (inside) quotes include odd-eighths; otherwise, it is an all-eighth one. As a
robustness check, I also consider diﬀerent cutoﬀ points: 20%, 15%, 10%, and 5%.
9As of May 1994, there were 13,810 issues in the TAQ database. Among them, 5,807 are Nasdaq
issues and 4,280 are Nasdaq common stocks or capital stocks. These 4,280 issues account for the
18,089,613 quote entries that I extracted from the TAQ database. Since I am interested only in tick
size one-eighth issues, only data entries with daily minimum bid prices greater or equal to $10 are
used.12 There are 10,687,739 quote entries for 2,760 tick size one-eighth issues. Using these quote
entries, ratios of odd-eighth quotes before and after the impact for each issue are calculated. After
getting rid of issues that do not have data entries for periods both before and after the impact, the
sample size reduces to 2,154 issues. These 2,154 issues are the “markets” that I study below.
As an example, in the pre-impact period there are 40,906 quote entries (combined bids and asks)
for MSFT (ticker symbol for the Microsoft Corporation). Of these quotes, only 124 bids and 158
asks include odd-eighths, less than 0.69% of total quotes. However, things change dramatically after
the impact. In the post-impact period there are 97,404 quote entries for MSFT. Of these quotes,
24,272 bids and 24,431 asks are in odd-eighths, more than 50% of total quotes. Hence, by all ﬁve
cutoﬀ criteria (25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and 5%), MSFT is a case OA market.
Table 1 presents the classiﬁcation of markets into these four groups. As one can see, dealer ﬁrms
practice odd-eighth avoidance in the vast majority of markets. A substantial amount of markets
switch from avoiding odd-eighth quotes to using the full spectrum of eighths (case OA), and a
comparable amount of markets use the full spectrum of eighths consistently (case AA). However,
most odd-eighth avoidance markets remain odd-eighth avoidance (case OO). Market makers do not
change their quoting convention from odd-eighth avoidance to the use of all-eighth en masse.I n
some rare cases (1.53% to 2.74%, depending on the cutoﬀ criterion), I even ﬁnd an all-eighth market
becomes an odd-eighth avoidance one after the impact (case AO).
12The Nasdaq tick size rule (for both NNM and Nasdaq SmallCap) in May, 1994 is as follows: for issues with bid
prices greater or equal to $10, the tick size for prices is one-eighth, $1/8; otherwise, the tick size is $1/32. Any market
maker who posts a bid price of less than $10 can use a tick of $1/32 for quotes. Note that the tick size for an issue
could change throughout the day depending on market makers’ quoted prices. Note also that the tick size rule only
aﬀects quoted prices. Trades can occur at an increment of $1/256. For more information about the tick size rule and
other aspects of Nasdaq markets, see Smith, Selway, and McCormick (1998).
104.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
Time weighted daily average prices (twavgp) and absolute and relative spreads (twavgs and twavgrs)
are calculated using the TAQ quote data.13 All other variables — numbers of market makers (mmcnt),
trading volumes (vol) ,n u m b e r so ft r a d e s( numtrd), shares outstanding (shrout), returns, and re-
turns without dividends — are extracted from the CRSP database.
The dependent variable is the number of dealer ﬁrms in the market (mmcnt) .T h ev a r i a b l eo f
interest is a “treatment” variable (treat)t h a ti d e n t i ﬁes markets switching from odd-eighth avoidance
to all-eighth. It is called “treatment” because the switch causes compression in the proﬁt margin, and
it is exactly the eﬀect on the market structure of this compression in proﬁt margin that I am studying.
The other two variables of interest are the absolute and relative spreads (twavgs and twavgrs)w h i c h
measure proﬁt margins in the markets. There are ﬁve other variables — trading volume (vol), numbers
of trades (numtrd), shares outstanding (shrout), returns, and returns without dividends — that I
use to construct the control variables for trading activity, information-based trading, market size,
and volatility for each market.
Three variables are used to measure trading activity in each market: trading volume (vol),
number of trades (numtrd), and turnover (tnover).14 Market value or capitalization (mcap)a n d
average trade size (voltrd) are used to pick up the information-based trading in each market.15 It
is generally believed that the amount of information trades (as opposed to noise trades) decreases
as the company that issues the stock gets larger (and hence a higher market value). However, a
higher market value also requires market makers to commit more capital in the market. This would
reduce the incentive of market making in high-priced issues. Therefore, a priori, the eﬀect of the
market value variable (mcap) on market making is unclear. Another variable measuring the extent
of information-based trading is the average trade size (voltrd). As pointed out by Easley and O’Hara
(1987), given they wish to trade, information traders prefer to trade larger amounts at any price.
Therefore, trade size is also included as a control variable. Shares outstanding (shrout)m e a s u r e st h e
13The price is deﬁned as: p =( bid + ask)/2; the spread is deﬁned as: s = ask − bid; and the relative spread is
deﬁned as: rs = s/p×100.T h et h r e ev a r i a b l e s :twavgp, twavgs,a n dtwavgrs,a r ea v e r a g e so fp, s,a n drs,w e i g h t e d
by the associated length of time that the (bid, ask) price pair is active.
14Turnover is deﬁned as: tnover = vol/shrout.
15Market value is deﬁned as mcap = twavgp × shrout; average trade size is deﬁned as: if numtrd > 0, voltrd =
vol/numtrd;o t h e r w i s e ,voltrd =0 .
11size of the market. Finally, I use the absolute values of returns (aret) and returns without dividends
(aretx) to measure daily volatility in the markets.
The product is a daily data set of 2,154 markets. A three-year panel data set is then constructed
by taking the average of these variables except that square roots of the sum of squared returns
(srssqr) and returns without dividends (srssqrx) are used to measure volatility. Table 2 provides
the deﬁnitions and units of measure for all the variables. The rest of this subsection provides a
general picture of the markets that I am studying. To save space, the data for only two cutoﬀ
criteria — 25% (as in Christie and Schultz (1994) ) and 10% — are presented in some of the following
tables and ﬁgures. The data for the other cutoﬀ criteria are qualitatively similar.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for all the variables (daily) in the data set.
There are on average 11.55 dealer ﬁrms in one market. For an equal amount of buy and sell orders,
the average daily trading revenue is: vol/2 × twavgs = $41,665.30, while the average revenue per
trade is: voltrd/2 × twavgs = $540.85.
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the three-year panel by cases for two
of the ﬁve cutoﬀ criteria that I used. In general, the issues in the case OO markets have average
prices (twavgp) higher than those of the issues in other market groups. As expected, the average
and relative spreads (twavgs and twavgrs) in the case OO markets are the highest, and those of
the case AA markets are the lowest. The average and relative spreads decrease monotonically across
years in the case OO, OA, and AA markets, while they increase monotonically in case AO markets.
The table also shows that the case OO markets are thinly traded issues (vol, numtrd,a n dtnover)
compared to others. This may justify higher spreads in these markets due to higher costs of market
making in inactive markets. An important observation is that: the case AA markets are more
comparable to the case OA markets in terms of the average numbers of market makers (mmcnt)
and the control variables (trading activity, information-based trading, and market size), except the
diﬀerences in spreads and volatility.
How do the spreads and the market structure respond to the unpredicted exogenous compression
in the proﬁt margins? From 1993 to 1995, compared to the small declines in the average absolute
spreads of the case OO and AA markets, the decrease (increase) in the average spreads of the case
OA (case AO) markets is considerable. The spreads decrease by about $0.08 and $0.02 in the case
OO and AA markets, while it decreases (increases) by about $0.20 ($0.16) in the case OA (case
AO) markets. It is evident that the eﬀects of switching quoting conventions to the spreads are
12substantial. How does the market structure respond? Surprisingly, the average number of market
makers increases (decreases) in the case OA markets (case AO markets) across years despite the
slump (boost) in the average spread. Moreover, while there has been virtually no change (or small
declines) in the average spreads in both case OO and AA markets, the number of market makers
remains roughly the same in the case OO markets, while it decreases in the case AA markets. Of
course, these results are tentative as they fail to control for other market characteristics.
4.4 Empirical Method
To evaluate the eﬀect of an unpredicted exogenous compression in the proﬁt margins to the mar-
ket structure, I study the change in the number of dealer ﬁrms caused by the change of quoting
convention in the case OA markets. Thus, the treatment group is the case OA markets. The goal
is to estimate the “average treatment eﬀects” of the change. For this, I need to ﬁnd a control (or
comparison) group that does not experience the drop in the proﬁt margin, but otherwise experiences
the same changes in other aspects of the environment. There are two candidate groups of markets
for this purpose. One comprises markets where ﬁrms consistently price issues in the full spectrum
of eighths (case AA markets), and the other comprises markets where ﬁrms consistently practice
odd-eighth avoidance (case OO markets). Both groups do not experience the drop in proﬁt margins
caused by the media blitz of the collusion story.
There are several problems that needed to be addressed in designing an empirical strategy for the
estimation of the average treatment eﬀects. First, as I have pointed out in the previous section, there
are multiple equilibria and the theory is silent as to which equilibrium that a market eventually settles
upon. A maintained hypothesis is that the odd-eighth avoidance practice serves as an equilibrium
selection device to pick out the one with a higher spread. The basis of the ensuing empirical analysis
is that the media blitz was a focal event causing the equilibrium to shift to one with a smaller spread.
Those markets experiencing such a shift should be expected to experience net exit.
As pointed out by Meyer (1995, p.151): “Good natural experiments are studies in which there is a
transparent exogenous source of variation in the explanatory variables that determine the treatment
assignment. ... If one cannot experimentally control the variation one is using, one should under-
stand its source. ...” In the context of my study, the question to be understood is: why are there
diﬀerent quoting conventions used in diﬀerent markets in the ﬁr s tp l a c e ?C a nt h ea s s i g n m e n tt ot h e
treatment or control group be random? The model in Section 3 shows that diﬀerent quoting con-
ventions can be supported in competitive equilibrium. However, in a subgame perfect equilibrium,
13ﬁrms earn normal proﬁts no matter which equilibrium spread at which the market settles. Therefore,
from a potential entrant’s point of view, other things being equal, it can be considered “as if” it
were random to join a market where the full spectrum of eighths are used (one-tick equilibrium),
or one where only even-eighths are used (two-tick equilibrium). Therefore, when the collusion story
hits the market, it is “as if” some markets (the treatment group) are randomly subjected to the
proﬁt margin compression caused by the change in the quoting convention while others (the control
group) are not.16
Nevertheless, as in other natural experiment studies, selection bias is always a concern (see
Heckman and Smith (1995) and Heckman et al. (1998)). Some markets switched their quoting
convention from odd-eighth avoidance to full spectrum, while others remained odd-eighth avoidance.
Although I would like to assume the switch of quoting convention to be exogenous, concerns of
selection bias would weaken the estimation results hinged on the exogeneity assumption. Hence,
for the empirical investigation, several econometric tools that control for potential selection bias are
employed.
5 Empirical Results
T h er e s p o n s eo fm a r k e ts t r u c t u r et oac h a n g ei np r o ﬁt margin is explored by measuring the change
in the numbers of market makers in the treatment group before and after the switch in quoting
convention (from odd-eighth avoidance to using the full spectrum of eighths). Hence, it is necessary
to establish a link between the change in proﬁt margin as a result of the change in the quoting
convention. I interpret the switch as being unexpected and exogenous; being caused by the extensive
media coverage of the collusion allegation associated with the odd-eighth avoidance practice.
5.1 Proﬁt Margins, Quoting Convention, and the Market Structure
As pointed out in Section 4, for the markets that do not change quoting conventions (cases OO and
AA), Table 4 shows that there were small declines in the average absolute spreads from 1993 to
1995; about $0.08 and $0.02 in case OO and AA markets, respectively (see the 25% cutoﬀ part of
16Given that the assignment to the treatment and control groups is indeed random, case AA markets would be a
better candidate as the control group. As the summary statistics in Table 4 suggest that the case OO markets are
relatively thinly traded issues, it is diﬃcult to justify that they provide the “would-be results” for the actively traded
markets in the treatment group in the absence of the compression in the proﬁtm a r g i n s .
14the table for values of twavgs across years). One may want to attribute this to overall changes in
the industry; for example, greater eﬃciency in trade executions, decreasing average and marginal
costs of order processing, and so on. However, those factors cannot, at the same time, explain the
considerable decline of $0.2 in the average absolute spread in those markets that switched from
odd-eighth avoidance to the use of the full spectrum of eighths (case OA), nor can they explain the
considerable increase of about $0.16 in the average absolute spread in those markets that switched
from the use of the full spectrum of eighths to odd-eighth avoidance (case AO).
The theory in Section 3 establishes a link between changes in proﬁt margin and a switch in
the quoting convention. Recall that there are most likely two equilibrium spreads at the second
stage of the game: one being the marginal trading cost plus one tick (2C + ∇)a n dt h eo t h e rb e i n g
the marginal trading cost plus two ticks (2C +2 ∇). For simplicity, let C =0 .G i v e n t h e o n e -
eighth tick size, the equilibrium spread would then be $0.125 or $0.25. If the markets makers of a
certain issue eliminate either odd-eighth or even-eighth quotes, then the market would result in an
equilibrium spread of $0.25. Hence market makers can use the odd-eighth avoidance practice as a
device to coordinate their quotes, and thereby “select” the equilibrium with a higher spread. With
this explanation, the decrease (increase) in the average absolute spread in case OA (AO) markets
immediately follows. By switching the quoting convention from odd-eighth avoidance to the use of
the full spectrum of eighths, the equilibrium spread in the case OA markets (the treatment group)
decreases from the marginal trading cost plus two ticks to the marginal trading cost plus one or two
ticks. This is potentially a $0.125 decrease in the equilibrium spread. Furthermore, by switching
the quoting convention from the use of the full spectrum of eighths to odd-eighth avoidance, the
equilibrium spread in the case AO markets increases from the marginal trading cost plus one or
two ticks to the marginal trading cost plus two ticks. This is potentially a $0.125 increase in the
equilibrium spread.
The changes in the absolute spreads caused by the switch in quoting conventions are most clearly
shown by the time series plots of the spreads. Figure 1 presents the monthly average absolute spreads
for all four cases from the beginning of 1993 to the end of 1995. In general, the (average absolute)
spreads in the case OO markets are an upper bound on the spreads, while the spreads of the case
AA markets serve as a lower bound. Since there have been no changes in the quoting conventions
in the upper and lower bound markets, I do not observe substantial changes in the spread levels.
The spreads in the case OA markets start at a level a bit higher than the spreads in the case AO
markets in the beginning of 1993. Although there is a slight upward trend in the spreads of the case
AO markets, they never exceed those of the case OA markets before the impact hits the markets on
15May 27, 1994. However, by the end of the observation period (1995), the spreads of the case AO
markets are converging to the upper bound, while the spreads in the case OA markets are converging
to the lower bound. Moreover, the spreads in the case AO markets are much higher than those of
the case OA markets. The “crossings” happen exactly at the point when the collusion story hits the
m a r k e t s .T h es a m er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e2w h e r et h et i m es e r i e sp l o t so ft h er e l a t i v es p r e a d s
are presented.
The time series trend of the number of market makers is presented in monthly averages in Figure
3. It shows that the number of market makers in the case AA markets serves as an upper bound,
while the number of market makers in the case OO markets serves as a lower bound. The average
number of market makers in the case OA markets starts at a level higher than that of the case
AO markets by 1 to 2.5, depending on the cutoﬀ criteria. By the end of 1995, the numbers of
market makers in the case OA and AA markets converge, as do the numbers of market makers in
the case OO and AO markets. However, the converging trends start before the media story hits the
market. It is diﬃcult to draw conclusions about the change in market structure using the time series
plot alone. An econometric analysis is provided next to account for diﬀerent characteristics of the
markets.
5.2 Fixed Eﬀect Panel Regressions
The main regression analysis is based on the unobserved eﬀects panel data model that is popular
for program evaluations and policy analyses. The following is a time and individual ﬁxed eﬀects
panel regression setup that eliminates omitted variable bias arising from unobserved variables for
individual markets that are constant over time, and from unobserved variables for the industry that
are constant across markets.
Let i index a market, i =1 ,2,...,N,a n dt index the time period, t =1 ,2,...,T.I a s s u m e t h e
relationship between the number of market makers for market i at time t, yit,a n da1× K vector of
observed market characteristics, xit, is linear, and can be expressed as follows:
yit = θt + γTit + xitβ + ci + uit; i =1 ,2,...,N,a n dt =1 ,2,...,T.( 1 )
θt is a time-varying intercept term that captures the aggregate time eﬀect (time ﬁxed eﬀect). Note
that θt changes over time but not across markets, thus it controls for overall intertemporal changes
in the industry that aﬀect market structure regardless of whether the market is in the treatment
or control group. The time-invariant ci is the unobserved heterogeneity for market i,a n duit is
16the idiosyncratic error that changes across markets as well as time periods. Note that ci is the
unobserved individual eﬀect, diﬀerent across markets but not over time, that aﬀects the market
structure. Tit is a binary variable (0—1) that indicates the receipt of the treatment. For markets
in the treatment group (where market makers practice odd-eighth avoidance before the media blitz
and change to full spectrum afterwards), Tit =1 ,i ft belongs to time periods after the media blitz,
and Tit =0 ,i ft belongs to time periods before that. As to markets in the control group, Tit =0 ,f o r
all t.17 In the following, I use 1993 and 1995 data (a typical “before and after” comparison setup)
to perform ﬁxed eﬀect estimations. Speciﬁcally, depending on the choice of the control group, there
are three speciﬁcations for Tit:







if i is one of the case AA markets;
if i is one of the case OA markets.
2. The pool of case OO and AA markets as the control group. For this setup, Ti1993 =0for all







if i is one of the case OO or AA markets;
if i is one of the case OA markets.







if i is one of the case OO markets;
if i is one of the case OA markets.
Note that the treatment group — case OA markets — is the same for all three speciﬁcations.
Based on the summary statistics in the previous section, case OO markets are relatively thinly
traded compared to case OA and AA markets; therefore, more attention is given to the estimation
results of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation. Given the strict exogeneity assumption and the rank condition, the
ﬁxed eﬀect estimation of equation (1) gives us consistent estimators for the coeﬃcients of interest
(θ1,...,θT,γ,β
0).18
17To draw a direct analogy to the program evaluation problems, one may want to consider Tit as participating in
a program that causes a compression in the proﬁtm a r g i n .
18Denote wit ≡ (θt,T it,xit),a n dwi ≡ (wi1,wi2,...,wiT). The strict exogeneity assumption requires:
E[uit|wi,c i]=0 , t =1 ,2,...,T.D e n o t i n g yi = T−1 ST
t=1 yit,a n dwi = T−1 ST
t=1 wit, the rank condition re-
quires: rank
ST
t=1 E[(wit − wi)0(wit − wi)]

= K +2 .
17The dependent variable, yit, in the estimation equation is the number of market makers, mmcntit,
and the regressors (in addition to the two ﬁxed eﬀects θt and ci) Tit and xit are: treatit and (volit,
numtrdit, tnoverit, voltrdit, mcapit, shroutit, srssqrit, srssqrxit).19 The estimation equation with
the full collection of regressors is:
mmcntit =D93it + γtreatit + β1volit + β2numtrdit + β3tnoverit + β4voltrdit
+β5mcapit + β6shroutit + β7srssqrit + β8srssqrxit + ci + uit;
where: i =1 ,2,...,2154,a n dt = 1993, 1995.
The theory in Section 3 predicts next exit in markets that belong to the treatment group. Hence,
I expect the sign of the coeﬃcient of the treatment variable (treat), b γ, to be negative. As to the
control variables, recall that the three variables vol, numtrd,a n dtnover measure trading activity
in the markets. One then expects b β1, b β2,a n db β3 to be positive. The sign of the coeﬃcient of
the variable mcap, that measures the information aspects of trading, is undetermined for reasons
discussed above. I do expect the sign of coeﬃcient of voltrd, that also measures information trading,
to be negative. The sign of the coeﬃcient of the variable shrout, that measures the size of the market,
should have a positive sign. As to the variables measuring volatility, srssqr and srssqrx, negative
signs are expected.
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the case OA vs. case AA markets. There are ﬁve
panels in the table for the ﬁve cutoﬀ criteria. The sample size of markets increases monotonically
as the cutoﬀ criterion is lowered (from 579 markets with the 25% cutoﬀ criterion to 1,093 markets
with the 5% cutoﬀ criterion). For each cutoﬀ criterion, 11 diﬀerent combination of control variables
are estimated. The ﬁgures in parentheses are estimated standard errors. A three-star superscript
is used to denote that the estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level, a two-star
superscript for the 5%, and a single star superscript for the 10% signiﬁcance level.
The results are surprising. As one can see immediately from panel A (the 25% cutoﬀ criterion),
the associated coeﬃcients for the treatment variable (treat), b γ,a r ep o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant at the 1%
signiﬁcance level. Furthermore, the positive signiﬁcance of b γ holds no matter which cutoﬀ criterion
is used and the magnitude is fairly robust; ranging from 2.08 to 2.68 for cutoﬀ criteria of at least
10%. While the values of b γ diﬀer across columns within each panel, the diﬀerences are “small”.
19I make some changes to the units of measure for some variables. The unit of measure is millions for vol, millions
of dollars for mcap, and percentages for tnover.
18The one with the largest diﬀerence across columns is in panel A, where the discrepancy between the
largest and smallest values of b γ is 0.34.
These results suggest that the treatment (the switch from odd-eighth avoidance to full spectrum)
results in net entry of about two market makers, controlling for the time ﬁxed eﬀect, trading activity,
information aspects of trading, market size, volatility, and unobserved individual market eﬀects.
Considering the average number of market makers is about 13.65 to 17.37 in the treatment group,
an increase of two market makers is substantial. Moreover, this result is completely at odds with
what the competitive theory predicts in Section 3. I will return to this point later and oﬀer a possible
explanation.
The coeﬃcients of the variable that controls for the time ﬁxed eﬀect, D93it,a r ep o s i t i v ea n d
signiﬁcant in columns VI to XI. This implies that there are, ceteris paribus, fewer market makers
in both groups in 1995 than in 1993. From 1993 to 1995, the average number of dealer ﬁrms in a
market is decreasing regardless of whether the market is in the treatment or control group. The
values vary across columns and diﬀerent cutoﬀ criteria. Taking the estimates in columns X and XI,
panels A and B suggest there are on average about 1.25 fewer market makers in 1995 than in 1993.
The value is 1.13 in panel C, 1.06 in panel D, and 0.81 in panel E.
As to the control variables, the signs are as expected. The associated coeﬃcients of the three vari-
ables that measure trading activity in the markets: vol (average number of daily trading volumes),
numtrd (average number of daily trades), and tnover (average turn over ratio), all have positive
signs, when they enter the estimation equation separately (columns II, III, and IV). However, since
they are highly correlated, the signs of the coeﬃcients for numtrd turn negative and the magnitudes
of the associated coeﬃcients of vol become unreasonable (see column V), when all three variables
enter the equation. Thus, I drop numtrd for the other regressions (columns VI to column XI). Tak-
ing the ﬁgures in columns X and XI, an increase in daily trading volume by a million shares would
increase the number of market makers by 2.23 (see panel D) or 2.74 (see panel C), depending on the
cutoﬀ criteria. Note that, in general, an increase in trading volume raises the turnover ratio as well.
Therefore, the eﬀect of increasing average daily trading volume on market structure is reinforced by
the increase in the average turnover ratio. The estimation results suggest that an increase of 1% in
the turnover ratio would increase the number of market makers by 1.2 to 1.33.
The coeﬃcients of the two variables that measure the information aspects of trading, voltrd
(volume per trade) and mcap (market capitalization), are both negative. While the coeﬃcients of
the variable voltrd is insigniﬁcant when voltrd enters the equation alone (column VI) in panels A,
19B, and C, they are signiﬁcant at the 10% level in panels D and E. The coeﬃcients of the variable
mcap are signiﬁcant at the 1% level across columns (columns VII to XI), and for all cutoﬀ criteria
(panels A to E). Although the values of the associated coeﬃcients are small, these results imply that,
ceteris paribus, market makers prefer small-sized trades with low values of market capitalization.
The negatives signs are reasonable considering that information traders tend to trade larger amounts
to take advantage of their information advantage, and higher values of market capitalization imply
higher capital commitment in the issues that dealer ﬁrms market.
The coeﬃcients of the variable measuring the size of the market, shrout (shares outstanding),
are signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level across columns (columns IX to XI), and across all cutoﬀ
criteria; however, the value is small. Since the unit of measure for shrout is thousands of shares,
this suggests the partial eﬀect of an additional public oﬀering of 10 million shares would increase
the number of market makers by two. By way of comparison, the average number of outstanding
shares is about 13 million.
Finally, since the two variables used to measure the inﬂuence of volatility on market structure,
srssqr (square root of the sum of squared returns) and srssqrx ( s q u a r er o o to ft h es u mo fs q u a r e d
returns without dividends), are highly correlated, I add them to the estimation equation separately
(column X and column XI). The coeﬃcients of both variables are negative but insigniﬁcant.
Table 6 presents the estimation results using the pool of case OO and AA markets as the control
group (second speciﬁcation), and Table 7 presents the results using case OO markets as the control
group (the third speciﬁcation). These estimation results are essentially the same as the ﬁrst speciﬁ-
cation, though there are some diﬀerences. First, the magnitudes of the net entry results are smaller
in the second speciﬁcation, and even smaller in the third speciﬁcation. For the second speciﬁcation,
the eﬀects of the change in the quoting convention results in net entry, ranging from 1.31 to 2.41
market makers, while it ranges from 0.63 to 2.35 for the third speciﬁcation. Second, the magnitude
of the time ﬁxed eﬀect is also smaller in the second and third speciﬁcations. Finally, the two control
variables measuring the inﬂuence of volatility on market structure, srssqr and srssqrx are negative
as above, but signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
5.3 Correction for Selection Bias
It is useful to write down the panel ﬁxed eﬀect estimation equation (1) in another format. Since
there are only two periods (before and after the media blitz) one can diﬀerence (1) across time
20periods, and derive the following diﬀerenced equation:
4yi = φ + γTi + 4xitβ + εi; i =1 ,2,...,N; (2)
where: 4yi ≡ yit − yit−1; φ ≡ θt − θt−1; 4xit ≡ xit − xit−1;a n dεi ≡ uit − uit−1.N o t et h a t
Ti ≡ 4Ti ≡ Tit − Tit−1 = Tit for all i, and (2) is a single cross section estimation equation. If
market makers “choose” to switch the quoting convention, the selection problem arises as Ti maybe
correlated with the unobservable εi. I use several estimation techniques to deal with this concern.
One way to correct for selection bias in (2) is to use the ignorability of treatment assumption
of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Loosely, the idea is to control for observables (contained in
4x), hoping that Ti is uncorrelated with the unobservables conditional on 4x.20 As suggested in
Wooldridge (2002), I ﬁrst use a linear control function to correct for bias caused by the selection on
observables. The estimation equation with a linear control function is as follows:
4yi = α + γTi + 4xiβ + Ti · (4xi − 4xi)θ + υi; i =1 ,2,...,N. (3)
Given the availability of one or more instrumental variables, another way to correct for the
selection bias in (2) is to use instrumental variables to predict treatment partialing out other control
variables. Loosely, an instrumental variable has to be uncorrelated with the unobservable ui, but
correlated with treatment Ti once the other control variables (4xi) have been netted out. The IV
estimation result of the treatment coeﬃcient is essentially the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE)
estimator deﬁned in Imbens and Angrist (1994).







if i is one of the case AA markets;
if i is one of the case OO or OA markets.
In others words, here I use the practice of odd-eighth practice before the media blitz as an instrument
to predict the switch of quoting convention. For markets that suﬀered the media blitz zi =1 ,a n d
zi =0for those ones that did not. It is obvious that zi is correlated with the treatment. The question
is whether zi is uncorrelated with the unobservables. For zi to be a valid instrument, controlling for
the observables, the practice of odd-eighth avoidance before the media blitz has to be as if it were
20The exact expression of the ignorability of treatment assumption of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) requires a
counterfactual framework that would complicate the discussion. See Wooldridge (2002) for a rigorous discussion.
21randomly decided. The study of Christie and Schultz (1994) justiﬁes my choice of the instrument
as they found no variables that can account for the diﬀerence in quoting conventions.21
More recent studies use propensity scores to correct for selection on observables. Deﬁne the
propensity score as:
p(4x)=P r.{T =1 |4x}
which is the probability of switching (receiving the treatment) given the observables (contained in
4x). The idea of propensity score matching is to construct the control group from agents that
do not receive the treatment but have the same propensity scores as the treatment group. Ideally,
the control of the propensity scores would eliminate selection bias and approximate a randomized
experiment.
The average treatment eﬀect of propensity score matching estimation is through the following
thought experiment. Suppose one chooses a propensity score at random from the population. Then
select two agents from the population sharing the chosen propensity score, where one receives treat-
ment and the other does not. Under the ignorability of treatment assumption, the diﬀerence of the
outcome is the treatment eﬀect conditional on the chosen propensity score. Averaging across the
distribution of propensity scores gives the average treatment eﬀect.
Typically, empirical implementation requires estimating the propensity scores, estimating the
diﬀerences in the outcomes for pairs matched on the basis of the estimated propensity scores, and
then averaging over all such pairs. For my purpose, the estimated propensity scores are used to
construct treatment-control matches for the estimation of the diﬀerenced equation (2). In particular,
I use a 5 to 1 digit match (greedy match) on the probit estimation of the propensity score Pr.{T =




T∗ = η + 4xψ + ν,
T =1 [ T∗ ≥ 0].
Denote the estimated propensity score as b pi ≡ Pr.{b η + 4xib ψ + νi > 0|4xi}.N o t e t h a t o n e c a n
also perform the IV estimation using matched samples.
There are two other estimation methods using the estimated propensity scores without matching.
21For a direct analogy to the program participation problem, one may want to consider zi as the randomized
eligibility of treatment, while Ti is the actual participation.
22For more information about the greedy matching algorithm that I use here, see Parsons (2000, 2001).
22Wooldridge (1999) shows that under certain conditions, OLS regression of the equation:23
4yi = α + γTi + δb pi + ui; i =1 ,2,...,N, (4)
yields a consistent estimator of the average treatment eﬀect. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest
a more general format based on the following equation:
4yi = α + γTi + δ1b pi + δ2Ti · (b pi − b pi)+ui; i =1 ,2,...,N. (5)
For conditions under which OLS results of (4) and (5) consistently estimate the average treatment
eﬀect, see Wooldridge (2002).
As in the ﬁxed eﬀect panel regression analyses above, three diﬀerent control groups are considered
for each of the following estimation methods: linear control function estimation (LCFE), propensity
score matching estimation (PSME), and other estimation methods with estimated propensity scores
(OPSE). Note that the instrumental variable zi that I proposed previously is available only when the
control group is the pool of case OO and AA markets. In the following, I only report the estimated
coeﬃcient for the treatment eﬀect. Complete estimation results are available on request.
There are three panels in Table 8 for the three control group speciﬁcations, and ﬁve columns with
each column presenting the estimated average treat eﬀects of one of the above estimation methods.
The ﬁgures on the ﬁrst column are the ﬁxed eﬀect panel estimations of the coeﬃcient b γ (FEPE),
taking from column X0s of Table 5, 6, and 7. The second column presents the LCFE results. The
t h i r dc o l u m np r e s e n t st h eP S M Er e s u l t s . T h ef o u rth column presents the estimation results of
equation (4). Finally, the ﬁfth column presents the estimation results of equation (5).
It is evident from Table 8 that the net entry result that I derived from the ﬁxed eﬀect panel
estimations is robust and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (except for a few cases in panel C where the case
OO markets are taken as the control group). Moreover, within each panel for the same cutoﬀ,t h e r e
is little variation in the magnitudes of the average treatment eﬀect across estimation methods (read
the ﬁgures row by row). For example, the average treatment eﬀect in row 1 of panel A (25% cutoﬀ
with case AA makers as the control group) is between 2.39 and 2.45 market makers. In general,
when the case AA markets are taken as the control group and the cutoﬀ is at least 10%, there is an
average net entry of at least two market makers (from 2.15 to 2.56) for those markets that switched
23Equations (4) and (5) can be views as the diﬀerenced equation (2) with e pi and Ti · (e pi − e pi) as control functions.
23their quoting convention from odd-eighth avoidance to the full spectrum. The ﬁgure is around 1.25
(from 0.95 to 1.59) when case OO and AA markets together are taken as the control group, while it
is about 0.6 to 0.7 (from 0.47 to 1) when the case OO markets are taken as the control group.
The estimation results with the instrumental variable zi involved are presented in Table 9. The
ﬁrst column shows the estimation results for the local average treatment eﬀects (LATE). The correct
interpretation of the estimators is that: they are the average net entry of market makers for markets
that use the full spectrum of eighths if they were odd-eighth avoidance and switched their quoting
convention to full spectrum. In other words, it is the average treatment eﬀect for those who would
be induced to switch by changing z from 0 to 1. The second (OPSE1IV) and third (OPSE2IV) show
the IV versions of the other two methods using the estimated propensity scores (equations (4) and
(5)). They are quite similar to LATE (the ﬁrst column) for both the magnitudes and signiﬁcance.
The “large” values (compared to what I have in Table 8) and monotonic decreasing trends of the
ﬁrst three columns require some explanations. For the former, based on the interpretation for the
LATE estimators, these ﬁgures can be considered as evidence of excessive entries in the odd-eighth
avoidance markets compared to markets quoting the full spectrum. Note that this is also an direct
implication of the theory in Section 3. As to the latter, as one lowers the cutoﬀ ratios of being
odd-eighth avoidance, more markets are designated as odd-avoidance. This lowers the estimated
eﬀects.24
In particular, ignoring 4x in equation (2), the LATE estimator b γLATE can be expressed as:
b γLATE =
4yi(zi =1 )− 4yi(zi =0 )
Ti(zi =1 )− T i(zi =0 )
. (6)
Note that Ti(zi =0 )=0in (6) Since 1/(Ti(zi =1 )is about 5 to 6 for the 25% cutoﬀ (see Table
1), it “blows” up b γLATE. As one lowers the cutoﬀ, 1/(Ti(zi =1 )decreases. As a matter of fact,
the estimation results in column 4 (PSMEIV) of Table 9 use only matched treatment-control pairs.
The IV estimation results of equation (2) are very close to the estimated average treatment eﬀects
in panel B of Table 8.
In summary, Tables 8 and 9 clearly demonstrate the change in the market structure for markets
that went from largely quoting even-eighths to quoting the full spectrum. Moreover, this result is
robust to various estimation methods. Surprisingly, the eﬀect of the change in the quoting convention
24See Heckman and Robb (1985), Bjorklund and Moﬃtt (1987), and Imbens and Angrist (1994) for discussions on
marginal vs. average eﬀects in the labor market studies.
24(and thereby the compression of proﬁt margins) was to induce net entry, instead of exit as the
competitive theory suggests.
5.4 Explanation and Discussions
The observed net entry in markets where proﬁt margins have fallen is puzzling. The competitive
framework in Section 3 cannot account for net entry occurring in response to a compression of
proﬁt margins. A possible explanation is that there exists some market practice in Nasdaq markets,
unobserved by econometricians, that can be used as a device for entry deterrence. To what extent the
incumbent ﬁrms invest in entry deterrence depends on the size of the proﬁt margins to be protected.
Before the impact, in those high proﬁt margin markets (most likely the odd-eighth avoidance ones),
entry is successfully “blockaded” to preserve high proﬁt margins. However, the drop in the proﬁt
margin reduces incumbent market makers’ incentive to invest in entry deterrence and this invites
entry. But what is this potential avenue for deterring entry in Nasdaq?
Although market makers compete in bid and ask price pairs for order ﬂows, it is not necessarily
the case that the market maker with the highest (lowest) bid (ask) gets the sell (buy) orders. Orders
in Nasdaq may not be routed according to strict price-time priority due to a common practice
among market makers known as “preferencing”. By building up a relationship with order entry
ﬁrms (or brokerage houses), market makers receive order ﬂows through their proprietary network
connections with order entry ﬁrms, rather than through neck-to-neck price competition with other
market makers. After receiving a “preferenced” order, a market maker can either re-route it to other
dealers or execute it at the best prices (the lowest bid or the higher ask), not necessarily its own
bid and ask. This practice is called “preferencing”. In return for the routed orders, market makers
reimburse order entry ﬁr m sw i t hc a s ho rs e r v i c e s .
Could this preferencing practice serves as an entry deterrence device? Certainly, few dealer ﬁrms
would enter a market where most of the orders are preferenced. Moreover, according to the above
description, market makers’ ability to preference depends on the proﬁtability. Thus, it is possible
that the compression in proﬁt margins limits (or eliminates) the use of preferencing. Without
preferencing, given there are market making rents, dealer ﬁrms enter the markets.
Note also, the picture drawn above is also consistent with the collusion story. Before the impact,
ﬁrms in the odd-eighth avoidance markets (tacitly or explicitly) collude to use only even eighth
quotes and artiﬁcially maintain higher spreads than would otherwise be achievable. Furthermore,
25entry barriers, perhaps preferencing, preserves cartel rents in these markets. Once the media exposes
the collusive scheme and compresses spreads, investment in entry barriers falls which invites entry.
The preferencing as an investment for entry barriers explanation conforms with the theoretical
exploration of tacit collusion in dealer markets in Dutta and Madhavan (1997) and Parlour and
Rajan (2003). In addition, it is in accordance with the microstructure literature (e.g., Huang and
Stoll (1996) and Godek (1996)) that emphasizes the importance of institutional factors in explaining
ﬁnancial markets.
Although the above scenario seems plausible and theoretically justiﬁed, it is diﬃcult to directly
verify it due to the lack of data on preferencing. Nevertheless, evidence for this explanation as well
as the equilibrium selection argument that I used for the markets that switched quoting convention
can be found in the experimental study of Kluger and Wyatt (2002). In laboratory asset markets,
Kluger and Wyatt (2002) ﬁnd preferencing and internalization of order ﬂows allow market makers
to coordinate on less competitive equilibria. Furthermore, in their study, several markets indeed
reached a collusive equilibrium with wide spreads and near 100% internalization of order ﬂows.
Finally, most of the estimates for the control variables are qualitatively consistent with those
reported in Wahal (1997) and Goldstein and Nelling (1999), except the signs associated with the
time trend and market capitalization.25 Nevertheless, the negative estimates for time trend and
market capitalization are the same as in Weston (2000); however, he explains the negative time
trend as evidence of net exits due to reforms that compressed proﬁt margins in all the markets.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The competitive theory suggests a decrease in the proﬁt margin should, ceteris paribus,r e s u l ti n
net exit from market making, while the main ﬁnding of the empirical analysis is just the contrary.
I ﬁnd that the compression of proﬁt margins due to a switch in the quoting convention results
in net entry of about one to two market makers, after controlling for the time ﬁxed eﬀect, trading
activity, information-based trading, market size, volatility, and unobserved individual market eﬀects.
Moreover, the robustness and signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding do not change as diﬀerent estimation
methods are employed to correct for possible self-selection bias of the estimated average treatment
eﬀect.
25A direct comparison of the magnitudes of the estimates in this study with those in Wahal (1997) and Goldstein
and Nelling (1999) is not available due to diﬀerent setups (semi-log linear in the former and log-linear in the latter).
26Another ﬁnding that is not mentioned in other studies is that Nasdaq market makers practice
odd-eighth avoidance in the vast majority of markets during the time period of the study. After the
media coverage of the collusion story, while some markets switch from avoiding odd-eighth quotes to
using the full spectrum of eighths, most odd-eighth avoidance markets remain odd-eighth as such.
Hence, across markets, Nasdaq dealer ﬁrms do not change their quoting conventions en masse.
Nevertheless, for markets that do switch, there is indeed a substantial compression in the spread.
This paper points out several directions for further research. First, this study is another call for
theoretical developments on equilibrium selection. It is rare, in both theory and practice, to have
markets with an unique equilibrium. In cases of multiple equilibria, theories are often silent as to
the questions of how the equilibrium is achieved, at which equilibrium that the market clears, and
why. The importance of equilibrium selection study can be seen from the simple model in Section
3 where it demonstrates that the avoidance of using odd-eighth quotes can be non-collusive and
consistent with competitive equilibria. However, without a theory of equilibrium selection, collusion
is suspected. Second, an increasing number of studies emphasize the importance of the ability for
market makers to access order ﬂows in competitive markets. Nevertheless, certain market practices
such as preferencing or internalization, create obstacles to access. With data availability, one can
study the roles played by such practices in the determination of market structure and their welfare
implications.
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Case OO 1,532 71.12 1,459 67.73 1,368 63.51 1,255 58.26 987 45.82
Case OA 291 13.51 338 15.69 388 18.01 464 21.54 645 29.94
Case AA 298 13.83 320 14.86 350 16.25 382 17.73 463 21.49
Case AO 33 1.53 37 1.72 48 2.23 53 2.46 59 2.74
Total 2,154 100 2,154 100 2,154 100 2,154 100 2,154 100
Cutoff Point: 5%
Table 1. Numbers of Markets
Note: Samples consist of all tick size $1/8 Nasdaq common or capital stocks with quote data before and after the impact 
(total markets: 2,154). The sample period is from the first business day in 1993 to the last business day in 1995 (757 
trading days). In Case OO markets, dealer firms avoid odd-eighth quotes consistently (both before and after the impact). In 
Case OA markets, dealer firms change their quoting patterns from odd-eighth avoidance before the impact to the use of 
the full spectrum of eighths after the impact. In Case AA, market makers uses all-eighth quotes consistently. In Case AO, 
market makers change their quoting patterns from the use of the full spectrum of eighths to odd-eighth avoidance.
Cutoff Point: 25% Cutoff Point: 20% Cutoff Point: 15% Cutoff Point: 10%Dependent Variable:
Label
mmcnt
The Variable of Interest:
Label Unit
treat -















Absolute value of returns
Absolute value of returns without dividends (capital gains)
trading volume
number of trades 
turnover ratio 
volume per trade; trade size
Note 1.: All variables, except the two square roots of the sum of squared returns ( srssqr and srssqrx ) for the three-year 
panel, are daily time series data.The intraday quote data from the NYSE TAQ Database are degenerated to daily time 
weighted averages. Non-time series data from the CRSP Database is mapped to time series data according to the 
associated effective day and end day. For the three-year panel, all variables, except the two square root of the sum of 
squared returns, are average daily values. The square roots of sum of of squared returns ( srssqr) and returns without 
dividends (srssqrx ) are calculated year by year.
Note 2.: Time weighted average absolute spread (twavgs) is the average absolute spread weighted by the associate 
time that a spread is active during a day. Time weighted average relative spreads ( twavgrs) is the average relative 
spread weighted by the associate time that a spread is active during a day. The turnover ratio ( tnover) is defined as 
trading volume (vol) divided by total shares outstanding (shrout). Trade size (voltrd) is defined as trading volume (vol) 
divided by the number of trades (numtrd); if the number of trades is 0 then it is set to 0.
market capitalization
shares outstanding
square root of the sum of squared returns
square root of the sum of squared returns without dividends
number of market makers
time-weighted average relative spread
Description 
Table 2. Variable Definitions
Description 
treatment variableVariable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 1,205,099 11.55 8.29
vol 1,204,446 106,834.09 416,358.86
numtrd 1,203,983 64.57 255.95
tnover 1,187,827 0.006 0.012
voltrd 1,203,983 1,386.80 2,928.39
mcap 1,189,231 374,717.20 1,459,640.25
shrout 1,189,231 13,405.87 29,018.96
aret 1,203,936 0.020 0.022
aretx 1,203,936 0.020 0.022
twavgp 1,205,877 22.38 12.90
twavgs 1,205,877 0.78 0.91
twavgrs 1,205,877 3.87 3.07
Table 3. Summary Statistics: Daily DataMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 9.01 4.98 15.72 8.65 20.28 10.22 12.07 4.51
vol 48398.45 85977.48 195927.92 389222.56 234697.83 374502.72 75138.46 75403.24
numtrd 27.26 50.30 116.50 260.30 123.70 194.83 37.13 39.08
tnover 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.004
voltrd 1352.82 839.49 1823.12 919.27 1969.15 1645.01 1710.83 730.55
mcap 190070.26 342421.77 579641.62 2174112.47 487150.26 1183140.97 174876.73 183192.37
shrout 7522.48 8549.14 17763.97 30576.02 22922.34 37848.41 8900.97 7457.40
srssqr 0.415 0.158 0.413 0.174 0.330 0.168 0.328 0.168
srssqrx 0.414 0.158 0.413 0.174 0.330 0.168 0.328 0.168
twavgp 21.20 11.24 20.46 11.54 16.31 7.38 16.83 6.56
twavgs 0.93 0.83 0.52 0.14 0.30 0.08 0.45 0.30
twavgrs 4.79 3.12 3.15 1.38 2.10 0.85 3.10 2.33
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 9.08 5.14 17.27 10.10 19.66 10.24 10.81 5.16
vol 45717.62 100506.11 220928.66 501749.22 215685.86 395835.43 70328.02 106241.13
numtrd 27.07 63.82 124.74 288.15 120.32 219.41 36.90 59.92
tnover 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.005
voltrd 1316.77 817.64 1822.31 700.09 1857.77 903.16 1935.43 1218.53
mcap 206805.09 373550.79 635972.77 2550676.20 508618.26 1169759.30 202789.44 237790.36
shrout 8337.87 9629.09 22687.64 44268.63 25323.84 46212.06 9434.02 7890.41
srssqr 0.435 0.137 0.390 0.154 0.343 0.135 0.362 0.152
srssqrx 0.435 0.137 0.390 0.154 0.343 0.135 0.362 0.152
twavgp 21.30 11.94 17.84 8.66 16.50 6.65 17.97 7.32
twavgs 0.90 0.84 0.44 0.14 0.29 0.07 0.50 0.22
twavgrs 4.64 2.85 2.96 1.34 1.98 0.80 3.21 1.72
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 9.10 5.34 17.37 9.26 19.08 10.52 10.06 5.72
vol 62275.53 149340.08 299339.88 727917.87 279844.35 535737.90 108207.84 191228.78
numtrd 40.65 102.42 202.56 557.25 173.42 333.45 69.14 136.81
tnover 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008
voltrd 1202.83 726.67 1589.51 537.91 1713.19 745.76 1698.77 873.15
mcap 266884.09 489873.93 860438.07 4246895.76 664152.55 1482020.76 293242.38 426233.24
shrout 9470.85 10694.82 25382.44 58482.09 28349.02 51923.06 10931.61 9337.27
srssqr 0.396 0.157 0.384 0.168 0.353 0.169 0.408 0.123
srssqrx 0.396 0.157 0.384 0.168 0.353 0.169 0.408 0.123
twavgp 23.37 14.09 18.43 10.46 19.44 9.21 21.79 11.21
twavgs 0.85 1.07 0.31 0.12 0.29 0.11 0.59 0.28
twavgrs 4.14 2.86 2.11 1.13 1.80 0.90 3.34 1.87
Year: 1995
Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AO
Year: 1994
Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AO
Table 4. Summary Statistics by Cases (Cutoff: 25%)
Year: 1993
Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AOMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 8.54 4.55 13.65 8.03 18.96 9.97 10.47 4.57
vol 41988.01 68605.99 149602.14 324473.31 206131.88 342250.53 57690.85 69499.52
numtrd 23.82 41.17 88.54 214.43 108.40 178.48 27.64 32.96
tnover 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.004
voltrd 1301.92 837.85 1701.03 799.00 1934.51 1550.79 1661.62 1058.68
mcap 183008.63 334399.27 460499.77 1739651.93 419198.64 1062086.53 116237.52 141017.12
shrout 7135.99 7960.12 14836.37 25465.29 20043.23 34256.12 6182.93 4936.38
srssqr 0.417 0.159 0.421 0.160 0.334 0.173 0.317 0.147
srssqrx 0.417 0.159 0.421 0.160 0.334 0.173 0.317 0.147
twavgp 21.72 11.70 20.55 10.67 16.12 7.03 15.40 5.51
twavgs 1.00 0.89 0.59 0.27 0.33 0.12 0.51 0.23
twavgrs 4.99 3.31 3.47 1.64 2.36 1.09 3.72 2.08
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 8.57 4.72 14.79 9.24 18.29 9.94 9.51 4.11
vol 38977.65 75137.51 169074.24 416098.22 182551.14 356717.56 46657.56 83042.56
numtrd 23.25 48.39 95.81 241.04 102.32 198.11 25.61 46.17
tnover 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.004
voltrd 1267.15 821.48 1703.21 733.54 1841.94 897.45 1491.60 944.53
mcap 198862.90 354714.75 504723.29 2013780.82 433752.55 1047306.11 133621.96 191065.95
shrout 7839.96 8378.83 18421.47 36191.84 21990.95 41545.42 6560.06 5668.66
srssqr 0.435 0.136 0.420 0.152 0.347 0.138 0.406 0.136
srssqrx 0.435 0.136 0.420 0.152 0.347 0.138 0.406 0.136
twavgp 21.91 12.37 18.95 9.48 16.15 6.45 16.55 6.37
twavgs 0.96 0.90 0.54 0.23 0.32 0.11 0.61 0.24
twavgrs 4.80 2.99 3.38 1.76 2.26 1.07 4.13 1.94
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
mmcnt 8.46 4.82 15.49 8.71 17.77 10.14 8.68 4.61
vol 51930.10 109375.14 233694.22 607414.42 242632.81 488977.69 65738.58 150292.90
numtrd 34.47 76.36 155.46 459.71 150.65 304.84 43.96 107.21
tnover 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.006
voltrd 1151.31 711.83 1531.20 629.96 1698.92 745.62 1298.70 811.86
mcap 259477.95 456452.17 674014.04 3376182.28 567838.96 1341516.23 211751.68 374415.98
shrout 8931.45 9760.80 20885.43 47320.11 24778.31 47135.26 7358.66 7090.39
srssqr 0.398 0.153 0.389 0.171 0.354 0.164 0.427 0.175
srssqrx 0.397 0.153 0.389 0.171 0.354 0.164 0.427 0.175
twavgp 24.26 14.49 19.40 11.47 18.66 8.68 20.62 10.83
twavgs 0.92 1.17 0.38 0.15 0.31 0.13 0.69 0.37
twavgrs 4.34 3.01 2.49 1.37 2.02 1.09 4.15 2.95
Year: 1995
Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AO
Year: 1994
Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AO
Table 4. Summary Statistics by Cases (Cutoff: 10%) (end)
Year: 1993





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)FEPE LCFE PSME OPSE1 OPSE2
2.3904 *** 2.4456 *** 2.3524 *** 2.3912 *** 2.4027 ***
(0.4549) (0.4349) (0.5686) (0.5181) (0.5185)
2.3724 *** 2.4415 *** 2.4629 *** 2.3773 *** 2.3987 ***
(0.4229) (0.4056) (0.5027) (0.4838) (0.4846)
2.3939 *** 2.4471 *** 2.5555 *** 2.4016 *** 2.4219 ***
(0.3931) (0.3786) (0.4853) (0.4489) (0.4500)
2.1489 *** 2.2296 *** 2.1995 *** 2.1547 *** 2.1904 ***
(0.3570) (0.3427) (0.4424) (0.4066) (0.4068)
1.7416 *** 1.8154 *** 1.6158 *** 1.7569 *** 1.7808 ***
(0.2877) (0.2779) (0.3587) (0.3300) (0.3307)
FEPE LCFE PSME OPSE1 OPSE2
1.3054 *** 0.9457 *** 1.3167 *** 1.3391 *** 1.2267 ***
(0.2417) (0.2470) (0.4609) (0.2503) (0.2557)
1.3712 *** 1.0318 *** 1.4200 *** 1.3546 *** 1.2449 ***
(0.2253) (0.2285) (0.3786) (0.2338) (0.2380)
1.5881 *** 1.3013 *** 1.4057 *** 1.5447 *** 1.4593 ***
(0.2130) (0.2143) (0.3627) (0.2220) (0.2249)
1.4830 *** 1.2302 *** 1.4487 *** 1.4394 *** 1.3628 ***
(0.1980) (0.1964) (0.3160) (0.2053) (0.2064)
1.4138 *** 1.3215 *** 1.3657 *** 1.3907 *** 1.3546 ***
(0.1754) (0.1717) (0.2423) (0.1836) (0.1834)
FEPE LCFE PSME OPSE1 OPSE2
0.6255 *** 0.5631 ** 0.4710   0.4853 ** 0.4812 **
(0.2256) (0.2291) (0.4364) (0.2314) (0.2352)
0.7361 *** 0.6337 *** 0.5085   0.5479 ** 0.5164 **
(0.2105) (0.2127) (0.3837) (0.2150) (0.2171)
1.0048 *** 0.9320 *** 0.9464 *** 0.7893 *** 0.7427 ***
(0.2004) (0.2008) (0.3420) (0.2056) (0.2064)
0.9224 *** 0.7968 *** 0.7783 *** 0.7198 *** 0.7048 ***
(0.1875) (0.1871) (0.2937) (0.1916) (0.1914)
0.9951 *** 0.9024 *** 0.8574 *** 0.8683 *** 0.9387 ***
(0.1696) (0.1756) (0.2084) (0.1734) (0.1738)
Note 1. FEPE: fixed effect panel estimation results; LCFE: the estimation results of the differenced equation with a linear 
control function; PSME: propensity score matching estimation; OPSE1: the estimation results of the differenced equation 
with propensity scores as the control function; OPSE2: the estimation results of the differenced equation with propensity 
scores and interaction with treatment as the control function.
Note 2.: Values reported in parentheses are standard errors. '***' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is smaller or equal 
to 0.01; '*' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is smaller or equal to 0.05; '*' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is 




Table 8. Estimated Average Treatment Effects
A. Control Group: Case AA Markets
B. Control Group: Case OO and AA Markets












15% CutoffLATE OPSEIV1 OPSEIV2 PSMEIV
8.1954 *** 7.6410 *** 8.3451 *** 1.3761  
(1.6379) (1.6382) (1.9750) (1.4099)
7.1142 *** 6.2621 *** 6.5565 *** 1.7593  
(1.3456) (1.3320) (1.5275) (1.1390)
5.7044 *** 4.7805 *** 4.8063 *** 1.2205  
(1.0651) (1.0645) (1.1699) (1.0161)
4.4005 *** 3.7880 *** 3.6147 *** 1.7995 **
(0.8160) (0.8270) (0.8707) (0.8341)
2.4382 *** 1.7852 *** 1.6497 *** 0.5736  
(0.4938) (0.5171) (0.5204) (0.5520)
5% Cutoff
Table 9. Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
Note 1. LATE: local average treatment effect; PSME: 2SLS propensity score matching estimation; OPSEIV1: the 2SLS 
estimation results of the differenced equation with propensity scores as the control function; OPSEIV2: the 2SLS estimation 
results of the differenced equation with propensity scores and interaction with treatment as the control function.
Note 2.: Values reported in parentheses are standard errors. '***' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is smaller or equal to 
0.01; '*' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is smaller or equal to 0.05; '*' represents the P-value of the t-statistics is smaller 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Case OO Case OA Case AA Case AO